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THERE WAS NOTHING “NEUTRAL” ABOUT 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 9066 
Eric L. Muller* 
 
There is no more appropriate place to discuss the Japanese 
American cases of World War II1 than in the pages of the 
Arkansas Law Review.  This is not only because Arkansas was the 
only state outside the Western Defense Command2 to host not one 
but two of the War Relocation Authority’s (WRA) concentration 
camps3 for Japanese Americans.4  It is because one of the most 
important lawyers to oversee the development and administration 
of all the WRA camps was the dean under whose leadership this 
law review was founded:  Robert A. Leflar.   
Leflar’s is not a name that constitutional lawyers are likely 
to remember in connection with the mass removal and detention 
of Japanese Americans in World War II.  That’s because he, 
 
             * Dan K. Moore Distinguished Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law.  
I thank Professor Mark Killenbeck and the Arkansas Law Review for this opportunity to 
respond to Professor Killenbeck’s article. 
1. See generally Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v. United 
States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex parte 
Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).  
2. The Western Defense Command was an Army-administered zone designated by the 
War Department.  It included Army troops and installations all along the West Coast of the 
United States.  See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 201 (Gary Y. 
Okihiro, ed., 2013). 
3. The government’s euphemistic label for these sites was “relocation centers.”  ALICE 
YANG MURRAY, HISTORICAL MEMORIES OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR REDRESS 69 (2008).  The term “concentration camp” was in common 
use while the facilities operated, however, and is the preferred term among Japanese 
Americans and among scholars today.  See Eric L. Muller, The Nazi Analogy in Japanese 
American Civil Rights Discourse, 1 N.C. C.R. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
4. The states of Colorado, Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming were each home to one.  See 
Greg Robinson, War Relocation Authority, DENSHO ENCYCLOPEDIA, (May 6, 2015) 
[https://perma.cc/F3FK-X6ZN]. 
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unlike a Charles Fahy5 or an Edward Ennis,6 had no role in 
Korematsu v. United States,7 the notorious Supreme Court 
decision that is the subject of Mark Killenbeck’s article Sober 
Second Thought? Korematsu Reconsidered.8  But he played a 
much bigger role than those men, supervising the day-to-day 
work of the agency lawyers stationed at each of the camps from 
1942 to 1944.9  It was Leflar and a few other lawyers at his level 
who shaped the circumstances under which Japanese Americans 
were confined and ultimately released. 
Leflar’s role reminds us of the danger of what we might call 
a Korematsu myopia in the constitutional vision of this tragic 
chapter in the legal history of the United States.  Because it is 
Korematsu that generations of law students have read in their 
first-year classes and generations of scholars have analyzed, the 
Court’s opinion (along with its opinion in the Hirabayashi v. 
United States case10 of a year earlier) can be mistaken for an 
exhaustive account of the relevant history.  But just as there were 
crucial actors outside Korematsu’s scope, so were there crucial 
facts.   
This Korematsu myopia blurs the sharpest observations 
Professor Killenbeck draws in his article, not only of Korematsu 
but of its differences with the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in 
 
5. Fahy was the Solicitor General of the United States who argued the Korematsu case 
in the U.S. Supreme Court.  See Charles Sheehan, Solicitor General Charles Fahy and 
Honorable Defense of the Japanese-American Exclusion Cases, 54 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 469, 
469-70 (2014).  
6. Ennis was Director of the Justice Department’s Alien Enemy Control unit.  See id. 
at 472.  He is customarily celebrated for fighting—ultimately without success—against the 
War Department’s efforts to secure President Roosevelt’s authorization to uproot American 
citizens of Japanese ancestry and for urging Solicitor General Fahy to be more forthcoming 
and honest in his factual presentations to the Supreme Court in Korematsu.  See Eric L. 
Muller, Hirabayashi and the Invasion Evasion, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1333, 1348-49, 1374 (2010).  
In truth, Ennis’s role in cases involving Japanese Americans in World War II was far more 
ambiguous, and he himself was considerably less than fully forthcoming in the litigation he 
himself managed.  See  id. at 1348-49, 1369-73, 1377.  
7. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
8. See generally Mark Killenbeck, Sober Second Thought? Korematsu Reconsidered, 
74 ARK. L. REV. 151 (2021). 
9. Leflar served as Regional Attorney and Assistant Solicitor in the War Relocation 
Authority.  See Edwin E. Ferguson and Robert A. Leflar, The Law of the War Relocation 
Centers, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 564, 564 (1946); ROBERT A. LEFLAR, ONE LIFE IN THE 
LAW 58 (1985). 
10. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
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Trump v. Hawaii11 upholding the Trump Administration’s so-
called “travel ban.”  In this brief response, I tell a fuller story 
about the executive order that authorized the uprooting and 
detention of Japanese Americans, one that reveals Korematsu and 
Trump v. Hawaii as essentially identical where Professor 
Killenbeck sees difference.   
Many scholars see Trump v. Hawaii as a reenactment of the 
Court’s key mistake in Korematsu,12 and it is not hard to see why.  
In each case, the Supreme Court encountered government action 
marred by bias against a disfavored minority group (Japanese 
Americans in Korematsu, Muslims in Trump v. Hawaii) and 
upheld it against constitutional challenge.  This, it has long and 
correctly been maintained, was a betrayal of the strict scrutiny 
analysis the Court took pains to announce in Korematsu.13  Strict 
scrutiny, when applied correctly, should have doomed mass 
removal, and it should have doomed the travel ban as well. 
Professor Killenbeck, however, sees a “stark and potentially 
dispositive difference[]”14 between the two cases.  Korematsu, as 
he describes it, was a situation in which illegal and 
unconstitutional bias corrupted the enforcement of a neutral 
government order.15  The order, Executive Order 9066,16 
conferred power on the military to remove a person of any race 
from a military zone, but Lieutenant General John DeWitt 
subsequently enforced the order with invidious bias, targeting 
only Japanese Americans while leaving similarly situated 
German Americans and Italian Americans alone.  By contrast, 
Trump v. Hawaii, as Professor Killenbeck sees it, was just the 
 
11. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
12. See generally Lorraine K. Bannai, Korematsu Overruled? Far From It: The 
Supreme Court Reloads the Loaded Weapon, 16 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 897 (2018); Jamal 
Greene, Is Korematsu Good Law?, 128 YALE L.J.F. 629 (2019); John Ip, The Travel Ban, 
Judicial Deference, and the Legacy of Korematsu, 63 HOW. L.J. 153 (2020); Neal Kumar 
Katyal, Trump v. Hawaii: How the Supreme Court Simultaneously Overturned and Revived 
Korematsu, 128 YALE L.J.F. 641 (2019). 
13.  See Michael C. Dorf, SCOTUS Travel Ban Argument Post-Mortem and the 
Surprising Relevance of Korematsu, TAKE CARE (Apr. 25, 2018), [https://perma.cc/6Y8J-
NGXF]. 
14. Killenbeck, supra note 8, at 153. 
15. Killenbeck, supra note 8 at 169 (“Once in place, the scope and open-ended nature 
of the Order gave great leeway to the individuals charged with its implementation.  On the 
West Coast, they transformed it into a weapon wielded almost exclusively against Japanese 
citizens and aliens.”). 
16.  Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). 
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opposite:  a situation where Donald Trump, on the campaign trail, 
invidiously fantasized about banning travel by only Muslims, but 
then, once in office, implemented a ban that was religion-
neutral.17   
For Professor Killenbeck, this distinction creates a crucial 
doctrinal difference.  As we know, illegal discrimination has two 
elements—invidious purpose and disparate impact.18  In his view, 
both were present in Korematsu:  the original government order 
was neutral, but a racially motivated enforcer saw to it that 
Japanese Americans alone felt its impact.  In Trump v. Hawaii, on 
the other hand, Professor Killenbeck sees clear proof of only the 
first element, in the form of Trump’s biased statements against 
Muslims as a candidate.  The second element appears to be 
lacking because the enacted travel ban said nothing about 
Muslims or adherents of any other faith.19  It articulated neutral 
criteria for entry into the United States relating to security 
conditions in the countries where the travel originated.20  Those 
countries included a few where Muslims were not in the majority, 
and the half dozen Muslim-majority countries reflected only a 
small fraction of the world’s Muslim population.21  Professor 
Killenbeck does not go so far as to argue that the travel ban was 
categorically constitutional but says instead that its 
constitutionality turned on details of its enforcement that were 
unknown at the time of the litigation.22  
Professor Killenbeck’s argument can be summarized more 
simply:  in Korematsu, first there was neutrality, but it was 
replaced by invidious bias.  In Trump v. Hawaii, first there was 
invidious bias, but it was replaced by what appears to be 
neutrality.23  That is why the Supreme Court didn’t repeat the 
doctrinal error of Korematsu when it upheld the travel ban. 
The problem with this argument is its grounding in an error 
of historical fact.  The story of the removal of Japanese Americans 
 
17.  Killenbeck, supra note 8, at 222. 
18.  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
19. Killenbeck, supra note 8, at 207. 
20. See id. 
21. See id. at 203. 
22. See id. at 220-21. 
23. See id. at 222.  
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from the West Coast did not begin with Executive Order 9066, 
and it did not begin with racial neutrality. 
The idea of removing people from areas along the West 
Coast first came into the minds of military officials just three days 
after the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor.  On December 10, 1941, 
a rumor began to circulate that some 20,000 people of Japanese 
ancestry were planning an armed uprising in San Francisco to 
support a Japanese coastal invasion.24  Convinced by it, the staff 
of Lieutenant General John DeWitt at the Presidio developed a 
plan to take all of them, aliens and citizens alike, into military 
custody.  The plan received tentative approval, only to be 
scratched on the advice of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.25  
What is noteworthy is that even though the country was newly at 
war with Germany, Italy, and Japan, the plan envisioned the arrest 
of people of Japanese ancestry only.26 
Deliberations about removing people from the coastal zone 
resumed in January, focusing on enemy aliens—nationals of the 
countries with which the United States was at war, over whom 
federal statutory law gave the federal government control.27  The 
conversation at this point did not turn directly on race; there was 
discussion about Germans and Italians as well as Japanese.28  But 
a highly dubious proposal surfaced within the Navy to treat 
American citizens of Japanese (but not German or Italian) 
ancestry as enemy aliens, their United States citizenship 
notwithstanding.29  And General DeWitt also reserved special 
concern for Japanese aliens.  According to notes of a conference 
in January, DeWitt stated that while he lacked confidence that 
enemy aliens generally were law-abiding or loyal, this was 
“[p]articularly” true of “the Japanese,” as to whose loyalty he 
“ha[d] no confidence . . . whatsoever.”30   
In the middle of January 1942, Leland Ford, a member of the 
U.S. House of Representatives from Santa Monica, California, 
 
24. ROGER DANIELS, THE DECISION TO RELOCATE THE JAPANESE AMERICANS 15 
(1975).  
25. See id. 
26. Id.  
27. See Respecting Alien Enemies, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798); 50 U.S.C. § 21. 
28. DANIELS, supra note 24, at 15. 
29. COMM’N ON WARTIME INTERNMENT AND RELOCATION OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL 
JUSTICE DENIED 63-64 (2003). 
30. DANIELS, supra note 24, at 20 (quoting Dewitt).  
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became the first political leader along the West Coast to press for 
mass evictions of people posing supposed threats to security.31  In 
a letter to Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Ford proposed “[t]hat 
all Japanese, whether citizens or not, be placed in inland 
concentration camps.”32  He said nothing about German or Italian 
Americans. 
Pressure mounted for action against people of Japanese 
ancestry through the rest of the month.  On January 29, 1942, a 
Justice Department official agreed to the military’s proposal to 
remove all people of Japanese ancestry, including United States 
citizens, from Bainbridge Island, across the Puget Sound from 
Seattle.33  That same day, General DeWitt reported on the 
“tremendous volume of public opinion now developing against 
the Japanese of all classes, that is aliens and nonaliens, to get them 
off the land,” because “[t]hey don’t trust the Japanese, none of 
them.”34  Two days later DeWitt told a top aide that he wanted 
“all Germans, all Italians who are enemy aliens and all Japanese 
who are native-born or foreign-born” to be taken out of critical 
areas.35 
In early February, a battle opened in Washington between 
the War Department and the Justice Department over the scope of 
the President’s delegation to the military of authority to remove 
people.36  The focal point of the disagreement was the treatment 
of United States citizens of Japanese ancestry.  General DeWitt 
insisted on the power to remove all people of Japanese ancestry, 
including United States citizens; Justice Department officials 
believed such action unnecessary.37  The wrangling continued 
throughout the first ten days of the month.  Eventually the War 
Department, tired of the disagreement, went straight to President 
Roosevelt, seeking his authorization “to move American citizens 
 
31. Id. at 22.  
32.  ERIC L. MULLER, FREE TO DIE FOR THEIR COUNTRY: THE STORY OF THE 
JAPANESE AMERICAN DRAFT RESISTERS IN WORLD WAR II 25 (2001) (quoting 
Congressman Ford).  
33. DANIELS, supra note 24, at 31. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 33. 
36. COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION & INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, supra note 
29, at 72.  
37. Id. at 72, 74-75. 
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of Japanese ancestry as well as aliens” from “the entire West 
Coast.”38 
President Roosevelt dealt with the matter in a brief telephone 
conversation with Secretary of War Henry Stimson on February 
11.  Neither man took notes of the call, but Assistant Secretary of 
War John McCloy reached out to DeWitt’s office almost 
immediately afterwards with the news that Roosevelt was willing 
to give the Army “carte blanche to do what we want to,” 
including the specific “authority to evacuate American citizens of 
Japanese ancestry.”39 
President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 on 
February 19, 1942.40  It is true, as Professor Killenbeck notes, that 
the order did not mention race.41  Instead, it gave military officials 
the authority to remove “any or all persons” from military zones 
of their creation.42  Its language is neutral.  But there can be no 
doubt of what it embodied, or of the essence of the disagreement 
it resolved between the War and Justice Departments.  The order 
gave the military the specific power it had sought to affect the 
removal of United States citizens of Japanese ancestry—and only 
of Japanese ancestry—from the West Coast.43 
Over the following couple of months, General DeWitt 
proceeded to issue proclamations designating terrain up and down 
the coastal strip as military zones and ordering the removal of all 
people of Japanese ancestry from them.44  His motivation for 
doing this was transparently racist; he justified his actions on the 
basis that the “Japanese race [was] an enemy race” whose 
“strains” ran “undiluted” in the blood even of those born in the 
United States.45  But he was not a biased enforcer corrupting a 
neutral order.  Rather, he was a loyal enforcer bringing a biased 
project to fruition. 
 
38. DANIELS, supra note 24, at 44. 
39. Id. 
40. See id. at 49. 
41. Killenbeck, supra note 8, at 167.  
42.  DANIELS, supra note 24, at 49-50. 
43. COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION & INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, supra note 
29, at 85, 93.  
44. ROGER DANIELS, PRISONERS WITHOUT TRIAL: JAPANESE AMERICANS IN WORLD 
WAR II 53 (Rev. Ed. 1993). 
45. ERIC L. MULLER, AMERICAN INQUISITION: THE HUNT FOR JAPANESE AMERICAN 
DISLOYALTY IN WORLD WAR II 17 (2007) (quoting Dewitt) (emphasis omitted). 
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With this fuller account of how Japanese Americans came to 
be uprooted for wartime detention, let us now return to Professor 
Killenbeck’s effort to distinguish Korematsu from Trump v. 
Hawaii.  “In Korematsu,” Professor Killenbeck argues, “an 
initially neutral presidential order was transformed”46 by the work 
of “racist underlings”47 into “one targeting a specific group on the 
basis of their ethnicity and national origin.”48  The situation in 
Trump v. Hawaii, he maintains, was the reverse,49 noting that 
“pre-proclamation statements that were permeated with express 
bias eventually became a policy that was neutral on its face 
. . . .”50 
In reality, the situations are not the reverse of each other, but 
the same.  Japanese Americans were predefined as a security 
threat in 1942; Muslims were predefined as a security threat in 
2016.51  Neither General DeWitt nor President Roosevelt 
entertained the idea of uprooting any American citizens en masse 
other than those with Japanese parents, just as Donald Trump 
never spoke of a “total and complete shutdown” on entry into the 
United States for anyone but Muslims.52  Thus, it is difficult to 
see “stark and potentially dispositive differences between … the 
directives litigated in Korematsu and Trump [v. Hawaii,]”53 as 
Professor Killenbeck does.  They were both rotten with malign 
motive, and it took no machinations by evil enforcers to see it. 
I have argued elsewhere that there are meaningful legal 
differences between the mass removal of Japanese Americans 
from the West Coast in 1942 and Donald Trump’s 2017 travel 
ban.54  There is no need to catalogue them in detail here; suffice 
it to say that one can rationally distinguish the government’s 
ability to push citizens around inside the country from its ability 
to prevent noncitizens from entering the country.55  I therefore 
 
46. Killenbeck, supra note 8, at 222. 
47. Id. at 153. 
48. Id. at 222. 
49. Id. 
50. Killenbeck, supra note 8, at 222.  
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 199 
53. Id. at 153. 
54. See Eric L. Muller, Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and the Second Monster, 98 TEX. L. 
REV. 735, 744-45 (2020). 
55. See id. at 746. 
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agree with Professor Killenbeck’s claim that Trump v. Hawaii 
cannot accurately be characterized as a reprise of Korematsu.  The 
point of this brief response is simply to note that what 
distinguishes the presidential orders in the two cases is not that 
Roosevelt’s was clean at conception and later corrupted, whereas 
Donald Trump’s was corrupt at conception and later cleansed.  
Both were dirty from the start. 
 
 
